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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
STEVEN TROY SPAN,
:

Case No. 890152
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant relies on his opening brief, with the
exception of Point I subsection 3.a., which subsection asserted
that a prosecutor's racially motivated peremptory challenge
violates the federal Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.

This

assertion was laid to rest in the recent Holland v. Illinois
decision, discussed infra.

Appellant refers this Court to the

opening brief for the statements of jurisdiction, issues, case,
facts, and summary of argument.

Appellant answers Respondent's

brief as follows:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT APPELLANT, A CAUCASIAN,
WAS NOT A MEMBER OF A COGNIZABLE RACIAL GROUP,
AND THEREFORE COULD NOT CHALLENGE THE PROSECUTOR'S
RACIAL MOTIVATION IN PEREMPTORILY CHALLENGING MR. PHUNG,
SHOULD BE REVERSED.
A. THE PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF THIS CASE SUPPORTS APPELLANT'S
ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL.
The State argues that this Court's scrutiny of the
prosecutor's peremptory challenge of Mr. Phung is limited to
federal equal protection analysis, claiming that Appellant's
1

arguments to the trial court were based solely on Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); and State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 581

1
(Utah 1988).
Please refer to the transcript, provided in Appendix 1
of Appellant's opening brief, and note that, in argument before
the trial court, defense counsel initially cited State v. Cantu/
and then argued that the prosecutor's peremptory challenge
threatened Appellant's rights to representation of a fair crosssection in the jury venire (T. 62-63).
After the prosecutor explained his technique in
exercising peremptory challenges, he noted that Appellant is not
a minority (T. 64). Defense counsel then explained that
Appellant's race is irrelevant to the impact Mr. Phung, as the
only minority juror, might have on the verdict (T. 65).
When the trial court indicated that Batson places "the
burden on defendant to show that he's a member of a cognizable
racial group," defense counsel argued for an interpretation of
Batson that looks beyond the race of the defendant to "all the
facts and circumstances" of the jury selection process (T. 6566).

She then argued as follows:
In fact, it is my clear recollection
that even if this case does not specifically
say it, that there are numerous cases which
1

Respondent's brief at 11-13.

2
As noted in Respondent's brief at pages 20 and 21,
Cantu discusses not only federal equal protection, but also
relies on cases discussing federal and state impartial jury
provisions relating to fair cross-section representation in jury
selection.
2

indicate that the defendant need not be a
minority member himself in order to assert
this on his behalf.
(T. 67).
Without addressing these other possibilities/ the trial
court ascertained that Appellant is Caucasian/ and found that
Appellant had not met his burden to prove that he is "a part of a
recognizable minority group" (T. 68-69).

The trial court's

choice not to rule beyond Appellant's failure to qualify under a
strict reading of the first requirement articulated in Batson
might be explained by the court's primary basis for denying the
motion to quash -

timeliness of the motion^ - but is not

explained by and should not be disposed of with Respondent's
inaccurate waiver argument.^
3
Reference to the transcript bears out the trial court's
assessment that the primary basis for its rejection of the motion
to quash was the court's ruling that the motion was not timely.
See T. 65-69. The State concedes that the motion to quash was
timely raised. Respondent's brief at 7-8.
4
Respondent intimates in footnote 4 at page 7 of
Respondent's brief that perhaps the fact that defense counsel's
objection was phrased as a "motion to quash the jury"# rather
than as a motion for the prosecutor's explanation of the
peremptory challenge, might be an independent basis for affirming
the trial court.
The transcript of the proceedings in the trial court
demonstrates that defense counsel informed the trial court about
the procedure to be followed under Cantu; "In that case the
Supreme Court remanded the matter back to the trial court for a
hearing as to what explanation the prosecutor would be prepared
to give and to determine whether it was sufficient to find that
the exercise of the challenge of a minority member was based upon
any type of rational or objective criteria." (T .62-63). When
the trial court turned to the prosecutor, Mr. Bown then explained
his procedure in jury selection, in general and in this case (T.
63-64).
Of course, Appellant's arguments are not limited to
federal equal protection and the formula laid out in Batson, but
3

B. APPELLANT'S RACE DOES NOT PRECLUDE HIS CHALLENGE OF THE
PROSECUTOR'S PEREMPTORY REMOVAL OF MR. PHUNG.
The State argues that Appellant, because of his race,
is not entitled to challenge the prosecutor's peremptory
challenge of Mr. Phung.
In Holland v. Illinois, 46 CrL 2067 (No. 88-5050,
decided January 22, 1990), the members of the United States
Supreme Court, albeit speaking in dicta, indicated that Appellant
is correct in asserting that he may challenge the prosecutor's
peremptory removal of Mr. Phung without sharing racial identity
with Mr. Phung."
this Court might note that in Batson, the Court recognized that
it might be an appropriate remedy, upon a finding of racial
discrimination, to "discharge the venire and select a new jury
from a panel not previously associated with the case". Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 n. 24.
5

Respondent's brief at 8-11.

6
The majority opinion of Justice Scalia, joined by
Justices Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, and Kennedy initially quotes
Batson, "the defendant 'must show that he is a member of a
cognizable racial group . . . and that the prosecutor has
exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members
of the defendant's race'". Id* at 2067 (emphasis by the Court).
The majority mentions in closing that it is explicitly not
deciding the equal protection claim of a white defendant
challenging the removal of black jurors. JEd. at 2070. Justice
Kennedy, concurring, argues forcefully why "if the claim here [of
a white defendant challenging the peremptory removal of black
jurors] were based on the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause, it would have merit." Id. at 2071. Dissenting, Justice
Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, notes that a,
majority of the Court "has now concluded, a close reading of
Batson shows that a defendant's race is irrelevant to his
standing to raise the equal protection claim recognized in that
case." jEd.. at 2071. Justice Stevens, dissenting, argues that
the white petitioner challenging the peremptory removal of black
jurors "should have been permitted to prove that the exclusion of
black jurors violated the Equal Protection Clause." IxU at 2076.
4

Various members of the Court provide persuasive reasons
why Appellant's claim of prosecutorial racial discrimination in
jury selection is not contingent on Appellant's race:
We do not hold that systematic exclusion of
blacks from the jury system is lawful; it
obviously is not# see Batson, supra.
Majority opinion at 2068.
To bar the claim whenever the defendant's
race is not the same as the juror's would be
to concede that racial exclusion of citizens
from the duty, and honor, of jury service
will be tolerated, or even condoned. We
cannot permit even the inference that this
principle will be accepted, for it is
inconsistent with the equal participation in
civic life that the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees....Batson is based in large part
on the right to be tried by a jury whose
members are selected by nondiscriminatory
criteria and on the need to preserve public
confidence in the jury system. These are not
values shared only by those of a particular
color; they are important to all criminal
defendants.
Concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, at 2071.
The fundamental principle undergirding
the decision in Batson was that "a 'State's
purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on
account of race of participation as jurors in
the administration of justice violates the
Equal Protection Clause.'fl This principle,
Justice Powell explained for the Court, has
three bases: the right of the defendant "to
be tried by a jury whose members are selected
pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria,"; the
right of a member of the community not to be
assumed incompetent for and be excluded from
jury service on account of his race' and the
need to preserve "public confidence in the
fairness of our system of justice[.]"

5

Dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall, joined by Justices
Brennan and Blackmun (citations omitted).
Batson was a black citizen, but he had no
interest in serving as a juror and thus was
not a member of the excluded class. His
standing to vindicate the interests of the
potential black jurors was based on his
status as a defendant. Indeed, the
suggestion that only defendants of the same
race or ethnicity as the excluded jurors can
enforce the jurors' right to equal treatment
and equal respect recognized in Batson is
itself inconsistent with the central message
of the Equal Protection Clause.
...[W]hile the inference that the
discriminatory motive is at work is stronger
when the excluded jurors are of the same race
or ethnicity as the defendant, the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
is not limited to that situation but may be
present when, as here, the excluded jurors
are not of the same race as the defendant.
Dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens at 2076 (citations
omitted).
Additional discussion of the impropriety of the trial
court's ruling that Appellant was barred by his own race from
challenging the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of Mr. Phung is
provided in Appellant's opening brief at pages 9-13.
C. THE RELEVANT "COGNIZABLE RACIAL GROUP" INQUIRY IN THIS CONTEXT
LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT MR. PHUNG WAS AMPLY DEMONSTRATED TO
BE A MEMBER OF A "COGNIZABLE RACIAL GROUP".
1. THE PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF THIS CASE SHOULD PRECLUDE THIS
COURT FROM FINDING THAT MR. PHUNG IS NOT A MEMBER OF COGNIZABLE
RACIAL GROUP.
The State argues that the trial court was correct in
denying Appellant's motion, because Appellant failed to
demonstrate that Mr. Phung is a member of a "cognizable racial
group".
7

Inasmuch as the trial court's bases for denying the
Respondent's brief at 65-27.

motion were procedural (timeliness of the motion and Appellant's
lack of racial qualification to raise the motion (T. 65, 69)), it
is not clear whether the trial court declined to engage in Batson
analysis after considering the first factor (Appellant's race),
or if the trial court considered Mr. Phung a member of a
cognizable racial group.
This Court should be well aware that the cognizable

8

racial group question is one of fact.

If the trial court

recognized Mr. Phung's membership in a cognizable racial group,
the trial court's ruling is entitled to deference on review2
If the trial court did not reach the question of Mr. Phung's
membership in a cognizable racial group, and if this Court is not
satisfied that Appellant has already proved Mr. Phung's
membership in a cognizable racial group, it would be appropriate
for this Court to correct the trial court's procedural rulings
(that the motion was not timely raised; that Appellant did not
have standing to make the objection), and direct the trial court
to reach the substantive Batson questions (i.e. Is Mr. Phung a
member of a cognizable racial group?).
8
Cf. State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988)(in
determining whether a prima facia case of racial discrimination
in peremptory challenges had been made, this Court evaluated the
facts and circumstances).
9
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c) provides that
findings of fact are protected by the "clearly erroneous"
standard of appellate review.
10
The State argues in footnote 3 at pages 6 and 7 of
Respondent's brief that because the prosecutor, in explaining his
peremptory challenge of Mr. Phung, was not responding to "an
order of the trial court to provide a racially neutral
7

2. THE CONTEXT OF THE APPLICATION OF THE "COGNIZABLE GROUP"
CONCEPT DETERMINES THE MEANING OF THAT CONCEPT.
There are many different federal and state
constitutional and statutory methods of eradicating racial
discrimination in jury selection.

When faced with racial

discrimination in jury selection, courts frequently conglomerate
constitutional and statutory provisions and precedents.
The State disapproves of this practice, and calls on
explanation for the peremptory challenge to Mr. Phung", this
Court should remand this case to the trial court for a
procedurally correct Batson response from the prosecutor.
If this Court is willing to remand this case and give
the prosecutor a second opportunity to explain his peremptory
challenge, Appellant is entitled to be treated with the same
procedural fastidiousness. If this Court is not satisfied that
Mr. Phung is a member of a cognizable racial group, and is not
satisfied that the trial court so found, Appellant should be
allowed to address the question before the trial court.
11

See Appellant's opening brief at 10-22.
On page 13 in footnote 7 of Respondent's brief, the
State appears to contend that the federal and state jury
selection laws provide no independent guidance from
constitutional provisions, "Defendant's statutory arguments are
effectively subsumed within his constitutional arguments, in that
the statutes he cites merely reflect constitutional guarantees
under the federal and state constitutions."
While defense counsel did not mention the Utah Jury
Selection Act in her arguments to the trial court, both the
language of the act and this Court's decisions indicate that
there are separate statutory and constitutional challenges to
racial discrimination in jury selection. See State v. Tillman,
750 P.2d 546, 574 n.115, indicating that Utah Code Ann. section
78-46-16, and the federal counterpart, provide the exclusive
remedies for violations of the jury selection acts, and that
constitutional challenges should be brought outside the framework
of the Utah act.
12
E.g. State v. Cantu, 758 P.2d 517 (Utah 1989)(in
reviewing a prima facia case of racial discrimination under
Batson and the prosecutor's attempted rebuttal thereto, this
Court referred to cases decided under federal and state
constitutional fair cross section and impartial jury provisions).
8

this Court to clarify the hotly contested meaning of the phrase
"cognizable group" under a challenge to purposeful racial
discrimination in the peremptory challenge stage of jury
selection.13

The State notes semantic differences in the

cognizability standards applied in equal protection, fair crosssection and due process contexts r^

Because the cognizability

standards are not best understood by semantic distinctions, but
rather by the context in which they are applied, Appellant will
use the phrase "cognizable group" throughout this discussion.
Perhaps the most significant contextual factor in
determining a definition of the phrase "cognizable group" is the
mode of proof appropriate to the discrimination claim: is
"cognizable group" used to prove purposeful discrimination by
state actors, or is "cognizable group" used to prove
15
discriminatory effect of the jury selection system?
The phrase "cognizable group" was traditionally
applied in the context of federal Sixth Amendment claims of
system-wide discriminatory effect in jury pools.16

in this

traditional setting, the proof focused on statistics rather than
13

Respondent's brief at 16-25.

14

Respondent's brief at 15.

15
See State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 574-575 (Utah
1987)(recognizing that discrimination is proved either by
focusing on the discriminatory purpose of a state actor or by the
discriminatory effect of the jury selection system.
16
Gurney, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges
in Criminal Trials"^ 21 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law
Review 227, 276 n. 230 (1986).
E.g. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
9

purpose or intent - a claimant had to prove that the jury
selection system failed to provide an adequate cross-section of
the community# first by defining the statistical composition of
the community and then by comparing it to the statistical
composition of the jury pools for proof of disproportional
representation.

Because communities frequently contain a

higher number of groups than can be represented on a jury, a
claimant had to show that the underrepresented group was
statistically significant and statistically deserving of
proportional representation in the jury pool - a "cognizable
18
group".
The "cognizable group" concept was also used as a mode
of proof of system-wide discriminatory effect under the federal
.
19
Fourteenth Amendment in the selection of grand juries.
In this
context, the claimant was again required to present statistical
proof of disproportionate representation of a statistically
20
significant group - a "cognizable group".
The "cognizable group" concept was transplanted into
claims of purposeful discrimination in People v. Wheeler, 583
P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978) .21

Wheeler, unlike the traditional cases

17

Duren at 365-366.

18

Duren at 364.

19

Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).

20

Id. at 494.

21
Gurney, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges
in Criminal Trials, 21 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law
Review 227, 276 n. 230 (1986).
10

using "cognizable group" to demonstrate statistically a systemwide discriminatory effect, involved purposeful intent of a
state actor, a prosecutor using peremptory challenges to remove
black jurors from the venire.
rejected the

Ic3. at 752.

The court explicitly

statistical mode of proof of discrimination in this

context, explaining the complexities of that mode of proof, and
then focusing on the nature of voir dire:
We need not undertake in this proceeding
to mediate any such dispute among experts
[concerning the accuracy of the statistical
mode of proof], nor to decide which
computational method is preferable for
resolving attacks on the master list or the
venire. Such cases are clearly
distinguishable, as the final demographic
composition of those lists is known when the
issue arises: at that time, when all the
figures are in, mathematical techniques may
well be of assistance to the courts.... But
they are of little help during voir dire,
when the composition of the jury is
constantly changing under the influence of
challenges - and when counsel may be trying
to expose an emerging pattern of
discrimination in time to forestall an unfair
trial.
Id. at 763-764.
The Wheeler court then indicated that the relevant
inquiry should focus on the intent of the prosecutor, as
reflected by his performance during the voir dire, and by his
own explanation.

Id_. at 764.

At the time Wheeler was written (1978), Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), insulated from federal Equal
Protection inquiry prosecutorial intent in exercising peremptory
challenges.

This perhaps explains why the Wheeler court based
11

its decision on federal and state constitutional fair crosssection theory.

583 P.2d 748, at 757.

Unfortunately, there is

no explanation in Wheeler as to why the court chose to impose the
"cognizable group" concept in this context of purposeful
discrimination, and there is no explicit explanation of how the
"cognizable group" concept should apply in a case focusing on
22
purpose of a state actor, rather than on statistics.
Similarly, there is no explanation concerning the
application of the "cognizable group" concept in the context of
federal Equal Protection and purposeful discrimination of a state
actor.

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Court

imposed as an element of a prima facie case of purposeful racial
discrimination a showing that the defendant is "a member of a
cognizable racial group", citing Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482 (1977), a case involving statistical proof of system-wide
discriminatory effect.

476 U.S. at 96.

The Batson Court did not

apply the "cognizable group" concept in the case before it, but
remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of
whether Mr. Batson had presented a prima facie case, and whether
the prosecution could rebut it.

3x3. at 100.

In Batson, the impropriety the Court was focusing on
was the exercise of a peremptory challenge on the basis of group

22
Without explanation, the Wheeler court required a
showing that the jurors stricken were members of "a cognizable
group within the meaning of the representative cross-section
rule", and found again without explanation that the black jurors
stricken by prosecutor were members of such a group. 583 P.2d at
764 and n. 26.
12

bias (e.g. the prosecutor struck the black jurors because he
assumed the jurors1 conduct in the case would be determined by
23
their racial group). 476 U.S. at 97-98.
With this in mind,
perhaps it is best to define "cognizable group" in this context
by looking at the behavior of the prosecutor.

If the prosecutor

is exercising the peremptory challenges in a manner indicating
that he is acting on the basis of group bias, the jurors stricken
24
by the prosecutor constitute a "cognizable group".
While many courts disagree over the application of the
"cognizable group" concept in a case involving discriminatory
25 .
purpose of a state actor,

in our jurisdiction, it appears that

when a prosecutor appears to be exercising his challenges on the
basis of race, the jurors who are challenged because of their
race constitute cognizable group members.

See State v. Cantu,

750 P.2d 591, 596 (Utah 1988)(recognizing that "Hispanics or
23
For further discussion of "group bias", see People v.
Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 759-762 (Cal. 1978); Gurney, The Case for
Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 Harvard
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 227, 279-280 (1986); Due
Process Limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges, 102
Harvard Law Review 1013, 1022-1024 (1989).
24
See Gurney, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory
Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil
Liberties Law Review 227, 276 (1986)(noting the wonderfully
circular nature of this argument and other attempts at applying
the "cognizable group" concept in cases of intentional
discrimination in peremptory challenges).
25
See Respondent's brief at 16-25; Gurney, The Case for
Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 Harvard
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 227, 275-279 (1986);
Note, Due Process limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges,
102 Harvard Law Review 1013, 1019-1022 (1989); Altman,
Affirmative Selection; A New Response to Peremptory Challenge
Abuse, 38 Stanford Law Review 781, 803 n 110 (1986).
13

Spanish-surnamed persons are a 'cognizable racial group1 for
purposes of equal protection analysis under Batson,")7 United
States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1313-14 (10th Cir.
1987)(recognizing American Indians as a cognizable group under
Batson).
Finally, it appears that the "prima facie case"
outlined in Batson is not set in stone.

See discussion of

Holland v. Illinois, supra, indicating that perhaps the first
prong of the Batson test is not a mandatory showing.

The

"cognizable group" language in the Batson "prima facie case"
should also be interpreted in light of the enduring rule of
Batson, "In deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite
showing, the trial court should consider all relevant
circumstances."

476 U.S. at 96.

See also State v. Cantu, 750

P.2d 591, 596 ("In applying Batson retroactively, we will examine
the record to determine if all the 'facts and circumstances'
raise the inference that the prosecution used its peremptory
challenges in a racially discriminatory manner.").
3. THE PROSECUTOR ESTABLISHED MR. PHUNG'S MEMBERSHIP IN A
"COGNIZABLE GROUP".
While the prosecutor's participation in the voir dire
was minimal, his actions and words raise the inference that he
struck Mr. Phung from the jury panel on the bases of race and
group bias.

Defense counsel initially argued that the prosecutor

had struck the only minority venire member, arguing that
"minority members are more likely than other members of the
citizenry to vote for acquittal." (T. 62). In explaining his
14

peremptory challenge techniques, the prosecutor demonstrated that
in evaluating Mr* Phung, the prosecutor was operating with
notions of group bias:
It's my practice, simply, if I have any
question — it's more of a gut reaction than
anything. It has nothing to do with his —
in fact, I didn't even know about a study
that says they are more likely to be — I
think perhaps he has been around long enough,
and perhaps I can speculate. He's been
through enough, having come from Vietnam,
that I think that the study would be
different with Mr. Phung.
(T. 64). Compare Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 ("Just as the Equal
Protection Clause forbids the States to exclude black persons
from the venire on the assumption that blacks as a group are
unqualified to serve as jurors, so it forbids the States to
strike black veniremen on the assumption that they will be biased
in a particular case simply because the defendant is black.").
In striking the only venire member of a minority race
who was also the only venire member asked how long he had been a
citizen (T. 19), and then in trying to rehabilitate his
assessment of that prospective juror with racial generalizations,
the prosecutor provided ample proof that Mr. Phung is a member of
a cognizable racial group.
II.
THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT
THE UBALDI STANDARD
IN THIS CASE.
Appellant proffers for this Court's adoption an
automatic reversal standard designed to stop intentional
prosecutorial misconduct in Utah.
15

See Appellant's opening brief

at pages 30-34, discussing State v. Ubaldif 462 A*2d 1001
(Conn.)# cert, denied, 464 U.S. 916 (1983).

The State does not

contest the virtue of the Ubaldi standard, but seeks to
distinguish Ubaldi on the facts. 0

Specifically, the State

argues that contrary to the facts of the Ubaldi case, in this
case (1) it is unclear that the prosecutor intentionally violated
27
the trial court's order;
(2) the trial court responded
correctly, mitigating the harm caused by the prosecutor's
28
"mistake/misconduct1';
and (3) defense counsel waived this
issue by addressing the verboten evidence after the prosecutor
29
did.
A. THE TRANSCRIPT SHOWS THE PROSECUTOR'S INTENTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER.
Appellant refers this Court to Appendix 2 of his
opening brief, the transcript which demonstrates the prosecutor's
intent in disobeying the trial court.

The prosecutor was

examining his own witness, Grant Hodson, the owner of the burned
apartment (T. 411). When the prosecutor asked Mr. Hodson about
the repairs that had been done on the building since the fire,
defense counsel objected, and the trial court asked the
prosecutor to explain the relevance of the question (T. 412).
The prosecutor responded,
26

Respondent's brief at 27-31.

27

Respondent's brief at 30-31.

28

Respondent's brief at 31.

29

Respondent's brief at 31.
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Your Honor, I'm — what I'm attempting
to do is show that one person who might be a
suspect in the fire# this gentleman, had no
reason to do that.
•• • •

Had no reason to fire — to start a fire
in his own apartment; although he could be a
suspect.
(T. 413). Defense counsel indicated that she did not intend to
address that possibility, and objected to the lack of relevance
of questions concerning the condition of the building (T. 413).
The trial court sustained the objection (T. 413).
The prosecutor then asked Mr. Hodson "Did you sustain
any losses as a result of the fire?" and defense counsel's
objection was again sustained (T. 413). At that point a bench
conference was held, the content of which was recorded later the trial court ruled inadmissible evidence concerning Mr.
Hodson's responsibility or lack of responsibility for the fire
(T. 418). Two questions after the bench conference, the
prosecutor asked Mr. Hodson "Did you start that fire?" (T. 414).
Mr. Hodson replied, "No." (T. 414). Defense counsel objected,
the trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury
to disregard the question and answer (T. 414).
Defense counsel's immediate motion for a mistrial
focused directly on the prosecutor's improper conduct in
violating the court's ruling from the bench (T. 414-416).

The

prosecutor's response to this accusation was not to deny
intentional disobedience, but was to contest the trial court's
understood ruling, and to argue harmless error to the trial
court:
17

Each and every time there's a theft or a
crime where more than one person could have
committed it, I submit it is relevant. And
it's asked routinely about — with people,
"Did you commit it?" And I think that's —
that is relevant. I can't see any — the
Court sustaining the objection. I can't see
that there's any prejudice to the defendant.
(T. 416).
The court denied the motion for a mistrial (apparently
on the grounds that the court's instruction mitigated the harm
caused by the prosecutor), and defense counsel ascertained that
the prosecutor would not address the excluded evidence again (T.
418)•

Defense counsel requested the trial court to make a record

of the bench conference, and the court did so (T. 418):
Under the circumstances, it was
appropriate since the landlord hadn't been
charged, and there may be any number of
people that might be suspects. And under the
circumstances, I didn't think it was material
to the case, and so indicated that would be
my ruling.
(T. 418).

It was only then, on page 419 of the transcript, that

the prosecutor claimed to have misunderstood that ruling, which
ruling the prosecutor had already attacked on pages 416 and 417
of the transcript.
The trial court's failure to dignify the prosecutor's
apology with an acceptance or a rejection can hardly stand as
proof that the trial court was "satisfied" with the prosecutor's
conduct.

£f. Respondent's brief at 30-31.

B. THE TRIAL COURT'S CURATIVE INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY DOES NOT
CHANGE THE NATURE OF THE PROSECUTOR'S CONDUCT.
Considering the sequence of events reflected in the
18

transcript (after two sustained objections to the prosecutor's
questions of Mr. Hodson, followed by a bench conference between
the court and counsel, followed by the improper question of the
prosecutor and the answer of Mr. Hodson, followed by an objection
and the court's striking of testimony and instruction to the
jurors, followed by a request by the defense for a motion
outside of the jury's presence, the jurors were excused for a
five-minute recess), it would indeed be fanciful to assume that
the jurors' minds were wiped clean of the improper question and
testimony by the court's curative instruction.
Of course, the effectiveness of the curative
instruction has no relevance to the characterization of the
prosecutor's conduct.

While the Ubaldi court did note the lack

of a curative instruction in that case, the Ubaldi court seemed
concerned not with the curative impact the instruction might have
had on the jury, but on the corrective impact the trial court
failed to make on the contumacious prosecutor:
The prejudice to the judicial system as
well as to the defendant which flows from
circumventing the trial court's authority,
unlike the prejudice which can be calculated
by weighing the evidence presented, is not
easily assessed. "If the accused be guilty,
he should none the less be convicted only
after a fair trial, conducted strictly
according to the sound and well-established
rules which the laws prescribe." We note
that the trial court did not rebuke or
admonish the prosecutor upon the defendant's
objection to the improper argument. The
trial court's general charge to the jury
which included the standard instruction
relating to the state's burden of proof and
the defendant's right to remain silent,
cannot reasonably be viewed as obviating the
19

harmfulness of the prosecutor's remarks. Nor
do we view the failure of the defendant to
request a curative instruction in addition to
a mistrial as fatal to his claim where
deliberate prosecutorial misconduct was met
by the trial court's silence in response to a
proper objection during summation.
Id* at 1010 (citations omitted).
Both the trial court and the prosecutor in this case
need to be informed that prosecutors must treat trial courts with
candor and respect.
C. DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT WAIVE THIS ISSUE.
The State claim that defense counsel waived this
objection and issue by asking Mr. Hodson on cross-examination,
Mr. Hodson, you've never been questioned
as a suspect in this fire, have you?
No.
(T. 422-423).

Noting that defense counsel addressed the same

evidence the prosecutor elicited from Mr. Hodson, and citing
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-561 (Utah 1987), the State
characterizes this entire issue on appeal as invited errorr^
Had defense counsel been the first to address this
evidence (she was not), perhaps the State would be correct.

See

Tillman, 750 P.2d at 561 ("Inasmuch as defense counsel himself
chose to initiate and argue these comments and failed to object
to the prosecutor's response to the same, he should be deemed to
have invited the error (if there was any) and waived the
objection.").
In asking Mr. Hodson if he had ever been investigated
as a suspect in this case, defense counsel was merely trying to
30

Respondent's brief at 31.
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dissipate the prejudice caused by the prosecutor's improper
questioning.

Appellant has a right to a fair trial and to an

appeal, and should not be forced to choose between the two.
Defense counsel1s performance in seeking to salvage the trial was
correct and should not be read as a waiver of the issue of the
prosecutor's improper conduct.

£f. State v. Guinn, 752 P.2d 632,

636 (Idaho App. 1988)(after motion to suppress is denied and
evidence is admitted, defendant's introduction of testimony of
that evidence does not waive objection to is admissibility.).
III.
THIS COURT SHOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN THIS CASE.
While Appellant is certainly aware of the standard of
review of a sufficiency of the evidence argument, see Appellant's
opening brief at 40-41, that standard of review is not an
impossible one to meet.

See State v. Harman, 767 P.2d 567 (Utah

App. 1989).
During the State's case-in-chief, the prosecutor went
through six witnesses and two hundred and ten pages of transcript
in order to establish from the conflicting evidence that the fire
in this case was an arson fire (T. 89-299).
In trying to demonstrate that the fire was lit by
Appellant, the State used about 100 pages of transcript in
presenting the testimony of Ms. Lee (the victim of the fire,
antagonistic to Appellant due to domestic history) (T. 308-374),
Mr. Brown (friend of Ms. Lee's, who had altercation with
Appellant prior to the fire and investigation)(374-387), and Ms.
Bateman (friend of Ms. Lee's, who was drunk on the night of the
21

fire when she spoke with Appellant, and who was assisted by Ms.
Lee when questioned by the investigating officer)(389-410).
Undoubtedly the testimony of Mr. Hodson (eliminating
Mr. Hodson as a suspect) added to the State's case that Appellant
set the fire (T. 411-414).

But his testimony was admitted in

direct violation of the trial court's evidentiary ruling.
In these circumstances, this Court should seriously
consider Appellant's insufficiency of the evidence argument, if
not on the argument's own merits, then for an appreciation of the
prejudice caused by the prosecutor's misconduct.

See State v.

Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984)(under traditional standards,
prosecutorial misconduct must be prejudicial to be reversible).
CONCLUSION
Appellant requests that this Court reverse his
conviction.
Respectfully submitted this I [x day of y\\Y'
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